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CYBERSPACE AND THE STATE ACTION
DEBATE: THE CULTURAL VALUE OF
APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS TO
“PRIVATE” REGULATION
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN*

INTRODUCTION
The “old” days of legal and cultural theory about online interaction are already behind us. Commentators can no longer
speak confidently about cyberspace as an inherently unregulatable space, where sovereign governmental entities will be
impotent and where newly empowered individuals will force
the collapse of all kinds of cultural intermediaries and brokers,
from political parties, to media conglomerates, to corporations.
Instead, a “second generation” of thinking about the Net has
emerged,1 less sanguine in its analysis of online regulation and
more sober in its discussion of individual empowerment.

*Associate

Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. An earlier version
of this Article was presented at a Symposium on “Telecommunications Law for
the 21st Century,” held in February 2000 at the University of Colorado School of
Law. I am grateful to symposium organizer Phil Weiser and to the University of
Colorado Law Review for inviting me to participate. This draft incorporates many
helpful comments from participants in that symposium, as well as useful insights
offered by Laura A. Dickinson, Robert W. Gordon, John Owens, and my colleagues
Anne Dailey, Richard Kay, and Jeremy Paul. I also acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Bryan A. Carey.
1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of
the Internet, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 693 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Constitution
and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1996–97); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open
Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
759 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering ,
38 J URIMETRICS J. 629 (1998); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 T EX. L. R EV. 553 (1998);
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703 (1998).
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Perhaps the most significant observation made by such
second-generation theorists concerns the ways in which behavior may be regulated online. Many of us tend to think of
regulation solely as the coercive commands of a sovereign entity. When the legislature passes a law proscribing some behavior, or an administrative agency establishes rules, or a
court issues an order, it is easy to see how such activity regulates behavior. In contrast, it is more difficult to recognize the
powerful way in which our environment and the architecture of
our space applies a regulatory force. If one wanted to prohibit
automobiles from driving into a public park,2 for example, one
could pass a law forbidding such conduct and then hire police
officers to patrol for violations. But one could also simply build
walls that make it much more difficult (if not impossible) as a
practical matter for the automobile to enter the park in the
first place. It is important to realize that both the law and the
wall function as regulatory tools.
In cyberspace, this second type of regulation is likely to be
more powerful than the first because the “architecture” of cyberspace is determined by software code, which, by its very nature, is infinitely malleable and operates through the technology itself. Thus, in order to limit access to obscene or indecent
speech, a sovereign government can try to pass a law banning
such speech, but the government is likely to encounter enforcement problems. Such problems might include the difficulty of tracking down online perpetrators—particularly those
who disguise their identities—and the possibility that an offender is from a different jurisdiction, rendering him beyond
the regulatory reach of the enforcing government. Indeed, cyber-utopians initially proclaimed the online world an inherently unregulatable space precisely because of these types of
problems.3 A government is not limited to this style of regula2. This example derives from H. L. A. Hart’s classic discussion of the hypothetical ordinance prohibiting vehicles in a park. See H.L.A. H ART, T HE CONCEPT
OF LAW 126-30 (2d ed. 1994).
3. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); see also John Perry Barlow, A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration–Final.html>.
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the
future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. . . . I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies
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tion, however. Instead, it could create (or encourage the creation of) filters that will effectively “zone” cyberspace into areas
that can be entered only by those possessing certain qualifications—a credit card, for example, or an adult identification
number. This “code-based” regulation is potentially far more
efficient—and therefore far more powerful—than a coercive
command issued by a sovereign because the enforcement
mechanism is embedded in the technological architecture itself.
Thus, as James Boyle has observed, the “Austinian”4 positivist
model of the lumbering state, regulating through its unwieldy
apparatus of power, is being replaced in cyberspace by a model
of power more akin to that envisioned by Michel Foucault,5
where coercion is so much a part of the landscape that we often
fail even to recognize it.6
Significantly, not only sovereign governments, but also
private entities can wield this code-based power. If an access
screen requires a user to click “OK” to contractual terms, and
those terms obligate the reader to pay a dollar per page viewed
at a given web site, then the dollar fee becomes the “law” of
that web site, even if the copyright law would have permitted
the use for free.7 Similarly, if America Online wishes to censor
a user’s speech from its chatrooms, it can simply eliminate the
user’s on-line privileges, regardless of whether the First

Id.

you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you
possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. . . .
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based on matter, and there is no matter here.

4. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (Isaiah Berlin et. al. eds., 1954).
5. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: T HE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
6. See generally Boyle, supra note 1.
7. For further discussion of the relationship between copyright and contract
law in the online context, see generally Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The
Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76
N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Niva Elkin–Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of
Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997); William O. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 C HI.–KENT L. R EV. 1203 (1998); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti–Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 B ERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519
(1999).
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Amendment would protect that speech.8 And, perhaps most
importantly, because the technical standard-setting bodies of
cyberspace are non-governmental, they may face no real oversight at all.9
If private entities will play an increasingly large role in
creating the code that regulates cyberspace, what role does the
Constitution play in regulating those private entities? In his
recent book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence
Lessig argues that we must recognize code as a powerful regulatory force, and therefore subject code to the norms and values
of our constitutional tradition. This is an attractive argument,
and one to which I am sympathetic, but as a matter of legal
doctrine, it comes up against at least one major difficulty: the
state action doctrine.
Having its genesis in an 1883 Supreme Court decision
overturning Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation,10 the
state action doctrine, in its least nuanced form, rests on the observation that most constitutional commandments proscribe
only the conduct of governmental actors. For example, the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No state shall. . . .”11
As a result, the Supreme Court has often refused to apply these
constitutional provisions to so-called “private action.”
Thus—and again to express the doctrine in its least subtle
form—the state cannot constitutionally exclude AfricanAmericans from a government housing facility, but the Constitution is silent with regard to an individual’s choice to exclude
African-Americans from his or her home. Similarly in cyberspace, so the doctrine might go, the activities of private corporations, such as America Online or the new domain name governing body ICANN,12 or the various Internet technical
standard-setting groups such as the World Wide Web Consortium or the Internet Engineering Task Force, are not subject to
the Constitution because they are not state actors.

8. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436
(E.D. Pa. 1996). For further discussion of this issue, see generally Amy Harmon,
Worries About Big Brother at America Online, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at A2.
9. See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
10. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
12. The acronym stands for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers.
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Of course, as commentators have pointed out, the state action doctrine rests on the often illusory hope that we can draw
a clear and coherent line between what constitutes public as
opposed to private behavior.13 Indeed, Supreme Court decisions about state action have been uncertain and often inconsistent.14 And scholars frequently have criticized the state action doctrine both as a matter of historical fidelity15 and public
policy.16 Nevertheless, courts show no sign of discarding the
doctrine. For example, when an online service provider recently attempted to take action against an entity that had sent
junk e-mail on its service, a district court rejected the emailer’s argument that such censorship of e-mail violated the
First Amendment.17 The court relied on the state action doctrine, reasoning that the service provider was not the state and

13. See, e.g., H ENRY J. F RIENDLY, T HE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1968); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence—A First Step By Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379 (1983); Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private
Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. P A. L. R EV. 1289 (1982); Robert L. Hale,
Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. R EV. 1349 (1982); Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985).
14. Compare, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), with Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the
Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Alan R.
Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment: State Action, Federalism, and Congress, 59 M O. L. R EV. 499 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning
of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992).
16. For a sample of scholarly articles criticizing or condemning the state action doctrine, see Larry Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and
Self–Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975); Charles L. Black,
Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. R EV. 69 (1966); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. P A. L. R EV. 1296 (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); Louis Henkin, Shelley v.
Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Harold
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. C AL. L. R EV. 208 (1957); Anthony Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State
Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self–Help Repossession, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1; William Van Alstyne & Kenneth Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
17. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
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therefore was not subject to the commands of the First
Amendment.18
The state action doctrine, therefore, poses a significant
challenge to those who see private regulatory power as a threat
to individual rights and public discourse online. Not surprisingly, scholars focusing on cyberspace have revived some of the
arguments that have been used against the state action doctrine for decades, beginning with the Legal Realists in the
1920s and 1930s.19 The most common strategy is to denounce
the very idea that there is or should be a public/private distinction. Scholars advancing this argument have pointed out that
so-called private ordering always takes place against the backdrop of property and contract rights that are enforced by the
state.20 Therefore, they contend that any purported distinction
between public and private is inevitably incoherent. Accordingly, we might call this the “incoherence critique.” In the online context, a recent article explicitly resurrects this critique
and refers to the very idea of private ordering as a “myth” that
must be dispelled “[o]ne more time.”21
Although the incoherence critique may be correct, its appeal seems limited. Indeed, not only have courts been unmoved, but my guess is that most Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts to erode the
distinction between public and private. Most of us like to believe that there are spheres of privacy in which we exist, untouched by the state. The argument that such private spheres
are illusory, and that our activities are inextricably bound up
in the state, therefore, is unlikely to be persuasive. Consequently, a different sort of argument may be necessary. Instead of repeatedly trying to demonstrate that seemingly private activity is actually public, we could instead focus on the
benefits we might derive as a people from using the Constitution to debate fundamental societal values, without relying so
heavily on whether the activity is categorized as public or private.

18. See id. at 441–45.
19. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 C ORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927); Hale, supra note 13.
20. See infra Part IIA.
21. See Margaret J. Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295
(1998).
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I intend to undertake this second sort of inquiry. I will argue that constitutional adjudication can foster constructive societal debate about social and political issues. It can permit
courts to perform an educative function by articulating values
and constructing narratives that help constitute our national
identity. Further, such adjudication can create opportunities
for courts to operate as deliberative fora in which difficult political issues are addressed. For all of these reasons, we may
decide that measuring a broader range of activities against
constitutional norms carries significant cultural benefits. We
might call this approach “constitutive constitutionalism.”
Adopting such a perspective does not mean, of course, that
the constitutional claim will always be successful; constitutional norms might well have different force in different contexts and when balanced against competing considerations.
The important point is that, however such questions get resolved, at least we will have been forced to grapple with the
substantive constitutional question and to articulate the competing values at stake. The state action doctrine, in contrast,
takes such debates off the table altogether by asserting that
the activity at issue is private and therefore not a fit subject for
constitutional discourse. If one believes that such discourse, in
and of itself, has cultural value, then application of the state
action doctrine comes with a significant cost.
I do not intend, in this article, to offer a detailed framework for how courts should approach state action questions.
Moreover, I recognize that there are important arguments that
could be offered against permitting federal courts to adjudicate
constitutional claims in a broader range of cases. Such
counter-arguments implicate fundamental concerns about the
role of courts in a democratic system and the proper allocation
of power between the federal and state judiciary. Thus, I am
not advocating that every legal dispute necessarily be turned
into a constitutional battle. The goal of this article is far more
limited. It is my contention that a true debate about the appropriate contours of the state action doctrine is impossible until we recognize that there is more at stake than simply the coherence of the public/private distinction or even the
substantive check on private power that might result. We also
must consider the societal benefits that arise from a broader
conception of the Constitution. There can be little doubt that
scholars and courts, in discussing the state action doctrine,
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have paid insufficient attention to these cultural benefits.
Therefore, I argue only that we must take the benefits of constitutive constitutionalism into consideration before we can
truly evaluate the appropriate contours of our conception of
state action.
In addition, although a theory of constitutive constitutionalism potentially offers an even more sweeping argument for
broadening the state action doctrine than the incoherence critique, it seems more likely to resonate within the popular consciousness. Most Americans are likely to resist the notion that
the activities of America Online are “really” public and therefore subject to constitutional scrutiny. In contrast, it may be
more persuasive to say that, whether America Online is public
or private, there are certain values that we hold as a community, values that America Online may be threatening. Indeed,
if it is true that we already think of the Constitution as embodying such constitutive values of our society, it may seem
quite natural to use the Constitution as a touchstone for evaluating a broader range of social interaction. Moreover, an argument based on constitutive constitutionalism may also be
particularly persuasive in the context of debating online regulation, because in cyberspace it is perhaps easier to see how
private entities can threaten cherished constitutional norms.
My discussion proceeds in three parts. First, I will summarize Lessig’s argument that, in cyberspace, code is equivalent to law, therefore making private regulation an especially
powerful and potentially dangerous force. In particular, I will
focus on his claim that private filtering of online content poses
a greater threat to freedom of speech than a governmentmandated zoning scheme akin to Congress’s ill-fated Communications Decency Act. Second, I will briefly discuss some of
the scholarship targeting the public/private distinction in general and a recent attempt to apply this Legal Realist critique to
cyberspace specifically. I will also describe one court’s rejection
of this argument in the online context. Finally, I will offer my
alternative vision of constitutional discourse as a forum for debating social and political issues and for constructing narratives about constitutive values. Consideration of this perspective may serve to inject some often-overlooked cultural
considerations into the state action debate, both as it applies to
online interaction and to private power generally.
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This is a crucial time in the development of cyberspace because the regulatory framework we22 choose now, and the assumptions that underlie such a framework, will inevitably influence the way we come to think of online interaction. And, of
course, as online interaction increasingly pervades our daily activities, the regulation of cyberspace may well become simply
the regulation of our lives and expectations more generally. If
we view cyberspace as a libertarian utopia that must be free
from state interference or constitutional scrutiny, we may ultimately find that the online world (and society at large) has
become a place that runs roughshod over values of free speech,
privacy, and public access we hold dear. Thus, it is essential
that we take the time now to ask fundamental questions about
how the Constitution operates in this arena. Indeed, by asking
these questions, we will better understand what kind of people
we are becoming in the information age that is already upon
us.
I.

CODE, AND THE PRIVATE REGULATION OF SPEECH IN
CYBERSPACE

In his recent book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,
Lawrence Lessig argues that the technical architecture of cyberspace is a powerful regulatory force that must be recognized
in our policy-making and even in our constitutional debates.
Moreover, this technical architecture—or “code,” to use his
name for it—may be manipulated by private entities just as
easily as by sovereign governments. Thus, his insights directly
implicate the issue of whether such private behavior should be
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Lessig himself, however, appears to have little patience for the state action doctrine or the
public/private distinction on which it is based, and sloughs off
the issue with only a few paragraphs of discussion. In this
Part, I will outline Lessig’s argument, focusing on the issue of
free speech in cyberspace, and then discuss his response to potential objections grounded in the state action doctrine.
22. Although this article focuses on United States constitutional values and
their relationship to the regulation of cyberspace, I recognize, of course, that the
“we” who must be involved in decision making about online interaction is potentially global. Nevertheless, since a majority of the private entities creating the
infrastructure of cyberspace are based in this country, our own constitutional values are probably a useful place to begin the discussion.
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In his chapter on free speech, Lessig begins with the observation that any discussion of the subject cannot focus on
government behavior alone. He points out that “[t]wo societies
could have the same ‘First Amendment’—the same protections
against government’s wrath—but if within one dissenters are
tolerated while in the others they are shunned, the two societies would be very different free speech societies.”23 Instead, he
argues that “[a] complete account of this—and any—right must
consider the full range of burdens and protections.”24
Lessig places these various “regulatory” forces into four
categories: law, norms, market, and architecture.25 All four of
these “modalities” regulate behavior. For example, it is certainly true that, in most circumstances, the force of law embodied in the First Amendment protects my right to advocate
the decriminalization of drugs. But that legal protection is not
the only force operating on my behavior. A network of social
norms exists in society as well, and I might find myself
shunned by my neighbors for advocating an unpopular view. If
I care about my social standing in the community, such shunning will strongly influence my decision about whether to express an unpopular viewpoint.
Similarly, the market constrains my ability to advocate my
position. Television stations might refuse to carry advertisements advocating unpopular views for fear of losing revenue
because incensed viewers might stop watching. Even if I were
permitted to advertise, my financial resources and the cost of
advertising would clearly regulate how well my speech could be
disseminated within the society.
Finally, the architecture of our social space exerts a regulatory force. In the United States we do not have speakers’
corners in every city, most towns do not hold town meetings,
and because our social spaces are governed by the logic of the
detached suburban home, the automobile, and the interstate,
we generally do not have unmediated fora for speaking and listening to a variety of viewpoints on matters of public concern.
Thus, as Lessig points out, “the protection for controversial
speech is more conditional than a narrow legal view would sug-

23. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 164.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 165.
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gest.”26 Accordingly, he argues that all four “modalities”—law,
norms, market, and architecture—must be factored into any
accurate account of the content of free speech in America.
Turning to cyberspace, Lessig focuses primarily on the
regulatory force exerted by code—the technical architecture of
online interaction—and he contrasts code-based regulation of
speech online with the regulation of speech made possible
through law. Specifically, Lessig describes Congress’s attempt
to regulate pornographic material in cyberspace, the Communications Decency Act of 1996.27 This law made it a felony to
transmit “indecent” material online to a minor or to a place
where a minor could observe it, while giving content providers
a defense if they took good-faith “reasonable, effective” steps to
screen out children.28
As Lessig notes, the Communications Decency Act “practically impaled itself on the First Amendment,”29 because it was
both too broad and too vague. But the provocative question
Lessig takes up is whether there are other ways one might go
about regulating such online content and, if so, how we would
choose among the possible alternatives. In particular, Lessig
contrasts “zoning” solutions based in law, and “filtering” solutions based in code.
In a zoning solution, “[s]peakers are zoned into a space
from which children are excluded.” 30 This is the model adopted
both by the Communications Decency Act and by Congress’s
more recent attempt to regulate online pornography, the Child
Online Protection Act.31 Under these statutes, sites offering
the types of material Congress wants kept from minors must
deny access unless users can verify that they are adults. An al-

26. Id. at 166.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1997) (criminalizing the “knowing”
transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to any recipient under 18 years of
age); 47 U.S.C. §223(d) (prohibiting “knowingly” sending or displaying to a person
under 18 of any message “that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs”).
28. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1997).
29. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 174.
30. Id. at 175.
31. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 231). The only court to address the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Act from taking effect
pending further litigation. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d. 473, 477 (E.D. Pa.
1999).

COLORADO FINAL FINAL.DOC

1274

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

5/23/00 5:45 AM

[Vol.71

ternative zoning regime might require that minors and their
parents be given the ability to configure their web browsers so
as to identify themselves as minors. As a result, such minors
would then electronically announce their status as minors to
any site visited. Under this scheme, web sites offering restricted material would simply block access to self-identified
minors.32
Both of these zoning schemes derive from a government
command. In contrast, plans to develop a world wide web content-filtering system are proceeding in the private sector, without any express statutory initiative. This filtering system, developed by an internet technical standard-setting body called
the World Wide Web Consortium, is known as the Platform for
Internet Content Selection (“PICS”).33 PICS is not, in and of
itself, a rating system. Indeed, it is completely neutral among
the various possible ratings systems that might result. As conceived, PICS is simply a technical “language with which content on the Net could be rated, and with which decisions about
how to use that rated material could be made from machine to
machine.”34 Under PICS, both content providers and private
entities can rate web sites based on any rating system they
wish. For example, the Anti-Defamation League could develop
a set of ratings, as could the Christian Coalition, or the American Civil Liberties Union. At the same time, software manufacturers would compete to write software that could filter material based on the ratings.
So then the question becomes: how do we evaluate these
two different architectures for regulating speech? Significantly, the zoning regimes use legal requirements to force
speech behind certain technological walls; the filtering regime
follows from individual choice. Any organization can rate content, and individuals can choose the rating system they wish to
use. Thus, as Lessig points out, zoning looks like “censorship,”
whereas filtering looks like “choice,” and we are apt to embrace
filtering while denigrating censorship as unconstitutional.35

32. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 176.
33. See World Wide Web Consortium, Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS), (visited February 1, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/PICS>; see also Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 106.
34. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 178 (citing statements of PICS developers).
35. See id.
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Lessig argues that, from a free speech perspective, this intuition is completely backward. First, he points out that filters
can be imposed anywhere in the distribution chain. As a result, while we might assume that the PICS filter exists only on
the computer owned by the end-user, nothing in the technology
prevents an online service provider or a search engine from
employing one or more filters. Moreover, these filters can be
imposed without the end-user ever being aware of it. If I perform a search using a search engine that filters sites, my
search results will not reveal those sites that are blocked, and I
may never know that the filtered sites exist at all.
In contrast, under a zoning regime, those who are denied
access to a site are instantly made aware that they cannot enter. Thus, the exclusion is immediately subject to challenge by
the person being excluded. “Zoning . . . builds into itself a system for its own limitation. A site cannot block someone from
the site without that individual knowing it.”36
Second, Lessig argues that the filtering scheme relies on
the development of a market in rating systems, thereby encouraging organizations to filter far more than the harmful-to-minors speech that may be regulated under our First
Amendment jurisprudence. “[T]he market, whose tastes are
the tastes of the community, facilitates the filtering.”37 Accordingly, “[t]he filtering system can expand as broadly as the
users want, or as far upstream as sources want.”38
The zoning scheme operates with the opposite set of incentives because content providers generally do not wish to block
out potential users and would therefore want their sites to be
viewed by as many people as possible. The only limitations
would be those that may be constitutionally imposed. Further,
because the definition of the proscribed sites would be generated by the government, those proscriptions could be tested by
courts against the Constitution. As Lessig points out, “[t]he filtering regime would establish an architecture that could be
used to filter any kind of speech, and the desires for filtering
then could be expected to reach beyond a constitutional mini-

36. Id. at 179.
37. Id. at 178.
38. Id.
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mum; the zoning regime would establish an architecture for
blocking that would not have this more general purpose.”39
For these reasons, Lessig sees the filtering system as more
of a threat to the core value of free expression than a government-imposed zoning system.
In my view, we should not opt for perfect filtering. We
should not design for the most efficient system of censoring—or at least, we should not do this in a way that allows
invisible upstream filtering. Nor should we opt for perfect
filtering so long as the tendency worldwide is to overfilter
speech. If there is speech the government has an interest in
controlling, then let that control be obvious to the users.
Only when regulation is transparent is a political response
possible.40

Significantly, Lessig makes clear that he “would opt for a
zoning regime even if it required a law and the filtering solution required only private choice.”41 It does not matter to Lessig whether the regulation of speech derives from law, norms,
the market, or code. He looks only to the ultimate effect on
speech: “the question is the result, not the means—does the regime produced . . . protect free speech values?” 42
Thus, Lessig emerges with the somewhat surprising conclusion that a statute such as the Communications Decency Act
(drafted more carefully, of course) would better protect the
value of free speech than a PICS system that enables private
filtering. He opts for the government “censorship” regime because of his understandable fear that, in cyberspace, the most
significant threats to freedom43—whether they be free speech,
privacy, or any other substantive liberty—may not come from
governments wielding laws. “An extraordinary amount of control can be built into the environment [of cyberspace]. What
data can be collected, what anonymity is possible, what access
is granted, what speech will be heard—all these are . . . de-

39. Id. at 179.
40. Id. at 181.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lessig’s idea of freedom here, of course, is far broader than the traditional liberal conception, which focuses primarily on freedom of individuals only
as against the government.
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signed, not found.”44 And, though the architecture of cyberspace may embed core political and even constitutional values,
the architectures are, for the most part, private. “They are
constructed by universities or corporations and implemented
on wires no longer funded by the Defense Department.”45 As
the filtering example demonstrates, private entities using the
power of code may wield tremendous regulatory authority, but
because they are private, they are free from constitutional
scrutiny.46
But should such private power be free from constitutional
scrutiny? Lessig obviously thinks it should not, but instead of
mounting a sustained attack on the state action doctrine, he
barely engages the question at all. His only real argument is
that the malleability of code in cyberspace is unlike anything
the framers could have intended, leaving us free to decide for
ourselves how to apply the Constitution with regard to private
activity.47 This approach seems unsatisfactory. After all, even
if it is true that we are now free to “decide on our own what
[approach] makes better sense of our constitutional tradition,”48 we are still left with little guidance in actually making
choices about how to evaluate private regulatory power.
Thus, while Lessig forcefully argues that the technical architectures of cyberspace should be subject to constitutional
scrutiny, he does not squarely address those who would point
to the state action doctrine as an important and even a necessary part of our constitutional tradition. Indeed, at one point,
he even acknowledges that “[o]thers are obsessed with [the]
distinction between law and private action. They view regulation by the state as universally suspect and regulation by pri-

44. Id. at 217.
45. Id.
46. The zoning versus filtering question is only one of many examples Lessig
provides in his book. Moreover, his general concerns about private power in cyberspace are reflected in much of the leading legal scholarship about online interaction. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1. It could be argued, of course, that such
concerns are overstated, or that the consequences of private power in the online
environment can be addressed adequately in the legislative arena. This article
neither discusses nor takes sides on that particular debate. Instead, I take as
given that there are serious concerns, both within the scholarly community and
among the public at large, about the extent of private power in cyberspace, and I
suggest one possible response to such concerns.
47. See id.
48. Id.
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vate actors as beyond the scope of constitutional review.”49
And, he goes so far as to admit that “most constitutional law” is
on the side of those who espouse this view.50 He insists, however, that we “should not get caught up in the lines that lawyers draw,” focusing instead on “the values we want cyberspace
to protect,” and leaving the lawyers to “figure out how.”51
Such a statement may be satisfactory in a book aimed at a
popular audience, which Lessig’s is. But those of us in the legal academy who might be persuaded by Lessig’s warning
about private encroachment on fundamental liberties must
take the next step and develop arguments for why the Constitution should be interpreted to protect such liberties in the private arena. Accordingly, in the next Part, I review the critique
that using a distinction between public and private in constitutional adjudication is fundamentally incoherent. Then, in the
final Part, I will consider a possible alternative approach,
based on the cultural power of using the Constitution to articulate and debate constitutive societal values.
II.

STATE ACTION AND THE “INCOHERENCE CRITIQUE”

Academic opinion overwhelmingly has rejected the idea
that legal doctrine should rest on a distinction between public
and private action. Such criticism dates at least as far back as
1927, with the publication of Morris Cohen’s classic Legal Realist article, Property and Sovereignty.52 Yet, despite repeated
attacks on the public/private distinction, it survives both as a
matter of constitutional doctrine and popular intuition. This
Part briefly describes what I call the “incoherence critique” of
the state action doctrine as well as a recent article applying
that critique to cyberspace. Then, I will discuss one lower court
decision that nevertheless unhesitatingly applied the state action doctrine to bar a constitutional claim against an online
service provider, indicating that both the state action doctrine
and its public/private distinction are likely to survive despite
academic criticism. Finally, I speculate about why a doctrine

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 181.
See id.
Id.
See Cohen, supra note 19.
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that has been repeatedly subjected to withering scholarly attack continues to show such resilience.
A.

Critique of the Public/Private Distinction

Those who criticize the distinction between public and private in constitutional adjudication argue that the state action
doctrine is incoherent because the state always plays a major
role, implicitly or explicitly, in any legal relationship.53 First,
they observe that all private actions take place against a background of laws. These laws embody state decisions either to
permit or proscribe behavior. For example, legally permitted
actions are permitted solely because the state has made a decision not to prohibit those actions. If such actions ultimately
cause harm, it is therefore difficult to say the state has played
no role.
Second, individual choices are strongly influenced by the
context of state-created law. For example, a governmental
zoning scheme may well be the motivating force behind an ostensibly private decision about private property. Similarly,
scholars have demonstrated that the seemingly private behavior within a family is in fact heavily influenced by laws governing marriage, divorce, custody, property, and education. As
Frances Olsen has observed,
Both laissez faire and nonintervention in the family are
false ideals. As long as a state exists and enforces any laws
at all, it makes political choices. The state cannot be neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state
to do so. The staunchest supporters of laissez faire always
insisted that the state protect their property interests and
that courts enforce contracts and adjudicate torts. They
took this state action for granted and chose not to consider
such protection a form of state intervention. Yet the socalled “free market” does not function except for such laws;
the free market could not exist independently of the state.
The enforcement of property, tort, and contract law requires
constant political choices that may benefit one economic actor, usually at the expense of another. As Robert Hale

53. My discussion in this section owes much to Richard Kay’s excellent
summary of scholarship targeting the public/private distinction. See Richard S.
Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public–Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334–37 (1993).
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pointed out more than a half century ago, these legal decisions “are bound to affect the distribution of income and the
direction of economic activities.” Any choice the courts
make will affect the market, and there is seldom any
meaningful way to label one choice intervention and the
other laissez faire. When the state enforces any of these
laws it must make political decisions that affect society.54

Third, the state plays a role in defining what even counts
as a legally cognizable injury. Our property regime would
permit me as a property owner to exclude a trespasser who
wishes to put wallpaper over my windows, thus obstructing my
view of a beautiful vista. Yet that same property regime likely
would not permit me to prevent my neighbor from adding three
floors to her house, causing the very same obstruction to the
very same view. Thus, “[t]here is no clear distinction between
a state invasion of property interests and its inevitable role in
defining those interests.”55
Fourth, even the definition of what constitutes a legallycognizable person is dependent on law. For example, the state
has chosen to treat a corporation like a person. The state has
also implicitly conferred standing on human beings, but not on
trees.56 And, of course, as anyone with knowledge of the history of slavery in this country knows, the legal definition of a
human being is subject to change over time based on state decisions.57
Finally, scholars have pointed out that the idea of a public
sphere is itself a cultural construction, and that what an individual views as “public” will be a projection of his or her own
values and assumptions.58 Accordingly, the public sphere will
inevitably tend to reflect the perspective of more dominant
groups within society.59 Or, one can flip the argument around,
and similarly view the idea of a “private” sphere as a cultural
54. Olsen, supra note 13, at 837.
55. Kay, supra note 53, at 335; see also Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure
of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1991).
56. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972).
57. See, e.g., Dred Scot v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
58. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 7 (1990) (“In
truth, the line separating the private from the public sphere is . . . . a political
choice depending on ideology and deep cultural habits of mind.”).
59. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
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construction. Because one’s private choices are always made
through values, language, and beliefs inherited from and influenced by the culture at large, the state will always play a constitutive role in the shaping of such choices.60
Thus, the “conceptual categories in which we define what
is an injury, who has caused it, and who has suffered from it
are public artifacts.”61 Moreover, the distinction between public and private itself rests on cultural constructions that tend to
reflect dominant players in society. Accordingly, the very determination of what is public and what is private is inevitably
public.62
B.

Private v. Public in Cyberspace

Arguments about the distinction between public versus
private ordering have resurfaced in discussions about cyberspace regulation. Self-proclaimed cyber-libertarians have argued both that cyberspace is inherently unregulatable by territorially-based sovereigns and that, as a normative matter, such
a failure is to be celebrated because it will usher in the promise
of “bottom-up” regulation created by non-state actors.63 In this
laissez-faire vision, private entities will be free to create their
own law—the “law” of E-bay, for example, or the Terms of
Service created by America Online. Such private law will create, in effect, a free market in law. People will vote with their
browsers by flocking to those sites or providers whose law they
find acceptable.64

60. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES
AND COMMUNITY VALUES 144-45 (1988); CHARLES TAYLOR, P HILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 187-210 (1985); ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS

29-144 (1975); Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence,
57 U. CHI. L. R EV. 1447 (1990); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject , 69 T EX.
L. REV. 1627 (1991); Winter, supra note 15, at 387.
61. Kay, supra note 53, at 337.
62. See id.
63. See David G. Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized Law–Making in
Cyberspace, VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. (forthcoming), also available at
<http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/blackhole.html>.
64. See David G. Post, The “Unsettled Paradox”: The Internet, The State, and
The Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521, 539 (1998). Post
describes an “electronic federalism” whereby
individual network access providers, rather than territorially-based
states, become the essential units of governance; users in effect delegate
the task of rule-making to them, thus conferring a portion of their sover-
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In response to this perspective, one recent article, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, by Margaret Jane Radin and R. Polk Wagner, has explicitly revived the incoherence critique discussed in the previous section. As its title indicates, the article invokes the Legal
Realists and their argument that all legal relationships are
“public.” According to Radin and Wagner, the Legal Realists
demonstrated that, “[c]ontrary to laissez-faire ideology, the
‘private’ legal regimes of property and contract presuppose a
‘public’ regime of enforcement and policing, a baseline of background rights.”65
Radin and Wagner criticize what they view as a resurgence
of Friederich Hayek’s stylized distinction between bottom-up
and top-down ordering. Hayek believed that coercive rules laid
down by sovereign governments were to be avoided, while a
laissez-faire network of contracts and customary norms was to
be encouraged.66 Similarly, cyberlibertarians argue for bottomup norm- and contract-creation while criticizing any state intervention.
But, as Radin and Wagner explain, such a distinction is incoherent because, to the extent the “private” ordering in cyberspace depends on rules of property and contract, it is relying
upon norms created and enforced by the state.67 Moreover,
categorizing any particular regime as truly top-down or bottom-up, public or private, is difficult and perhaps impossible.
“To some, nuisance law is unwanted top-down regulation; to
others it is a needed limitation on property titles arrived at by
bottom-up coordination among neighbors.”68 Indeed, even legislation passed by Congress can be viewed as bottom-up if it is

Id.

eignty on them, and choose among them according to their own individual views of the constituent elements of an ordered society. The ‘law of
the Internet’ thus emerges, not from the decision of some higher authority, but as the aggregate of the choices made by individual system operators about what rules to impose, and by individual users about which
online communities to join.

65.
66.
(1973).
67.
68.

Radin & Wagner, supra note 21, at 1295.
See generally FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
See Radin & Wagner, supra note 21, at 1297.
Id. at 1298.
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thought of as the result of the grassroots efforts of various interest groups.69
Nevertheless, despite the continued scholarly critiques,
there is no indication that courts will be any more likely to
erode the public/private distinction in cyberspace than they
have been in “real” space. Although cyberspace case law is
very much in its formative stages, at least one lower court decision has explicitly refused to treat an online service provider as
an entity subject to the First Amendment.
The case, Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online,70 concerned America Online’s (“AOL’s”) attempts to stop Cyber
Promotions (“Cyber”) from sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements, often referred to as “spam,” to AOL subscribers. After both parties filed complaints against each other, the district
court asked them to brief the key constitutional question at issue: “Whether Cyber has a right under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution to send unsolicited e-mail to
AOL members via the Internet . . . .” 71
To answer this question, the court relied almost exclusively on the state action doctrine, finding that AOL was a private entity, not subject to the First Amendment, and was
therefore free to block Cyber’s e-mails as it pleased. The court
rejected Cyber’s contention that AOL’s activities had the character of state action. For example, Cyber had argued that
by providing Internet e-mail and acting as the sole conduit
to its members’ Internet e-mail boxes, AOL has opened up
that part of its network and as such, has sufficiently devoted this domain for public use. This dedication of AOL’s
Internet e-mail accessway performs a public function in that
it is open to the public, free of charge for any user, where
public discourse, conversations and commercial transactions
can and do take place.72

Cyber also argued that AOL’s Internet e-mail connection
constituted “an exclusive public function” because there were
no alternative avenues of communication for Cyber to send its

69.
70.
71.
72.

See id.
948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 442–43.
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e-mail to AOL members. 73 The court disagreed. The court first
concluded that, although AOL had opened its e-mail system to
the public by connecting with the Internet, it was not performing an “essential public service” and therefore was not
standing in the shoes of the State.74 Second, the court decided
that Cyber had “numerous alternative avenues of sending its
advertising to AOL members,” including “United States mail,
telemarketing, television, cable, newspapers, magazines and
even passing out leaflets.”75
It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a debate
as to whether these conclusions were justified, or whether the
court’s application of the state action doctrine to the facts of the
case was correct. What is important for our purposes is: first,
the assumption that the state action doctrine should govern
this case; second, the conclusion that a nominally private online service provider would not be deemed a public actor regardless of its role in controlling public access to information
online; and third, the fact that, because the court resolved the
case using the state action doctrine, it avoided having to discuss the substantive First Amendment issues raised by the
case. The Cyber Promotions decision makes clear that decades
of criticism of the state action doctrine have had negligible effect both on the continued vitality of the doctrine and on its expansion into new areas of human social interaction, such as cyberspace.
C.

Four Theories Explaining the Continued Vitality of the
State Action Doctrine

For those scholars most committed to the idea that the
public/private distinction is fundamentally incoherent, it is undoubtedly something of a mystery that the state action doctrine
continues to survive in our constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, during the 1960s alone, two scholars, Jerre S. Williams
and John Silard, wrote articles predicting The Twilight of State
Action76 and the Demise of the ‘State Action’ Limit,77 while
73.
74.
75.
76.
(1963).
77.

See id. at 442.
See id.
Id. at 443.
Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347
John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action”
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Charles Black began an article criticizing the doctrine with the
almost plaintive question, “State action again?”78 Nevertheless, despite a flurry of denunciation, which was followed in
more recent decades by Critical Legal Studies scholarship embracing and expanding upon the incoherence critique,79 the
state action doctrine shows no sign of losing its force.
Why should this be so? Why should a doctrine variously
accused of being incoherent, inappropriate, and irrelevant80
live on? Particularly if one is persuaded, as I am, that a coherent distinction between public and private action cannot logically be maintained for the reasons described in the previous
section, this question is difficult to answer. Nevertheless, four
possibilities spring to mind. Examining these possibilities may
help us to craft a different, and perhaps more intuitively appealing, understanding of the state action doctrine.
First, one could attribute the survival of the state action
doctrine to historical happenstance. Much of the ferment over
the state action doctrine until the mid-1960s can be traced to
issues surrounding racial segregation and discrimination. Indeed, a vast majority of the Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence until that point concerned race.81 These issues were
largely removed from the constitutional map with the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which explicitly outlawed private discrimination. Further, with the later passage of statutes outlawing private gender discrimination82 and discrimination against those with disabilities,83 many of the cases
formerly brought under the Constitution are now litigated as
statutory questions. Thus, there can be no doubt that the pressure that was mounting with regard to the state action doctrine

Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966).
78. See Black, supra note 16, at 69.
79. See, e.g., Casebeer, supra note 13; Kennedy, supra note 13; Olsen, supra
note 13; Winter, supra note 15.
80. See Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663, 663–64 & nn.2–4 (1995) (citing scholarly criticism).
81. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
(1957); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
83. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994).
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in the 1950s and 1960s has dissipated since then. As a result,
one might think that the state action doctrine has survived
simply because it is no longer on the national agenda, allowing
its incoherence to be overlooked.
While this view no doubt accounts for the lessening of
scholarly attention since the 1960s, it seems insufficient to explain the continued power of the state action doctrine, particularly given the interest generated by celebrated cases such as
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,84 and the critiques of the public/private distinction developed in the 1980s and 1990s by the Critical Legal Studies
movement. However, to the extent that the only reason the
state action doctrine has survived is its lack of importance, we
might expect to see more attention paid to the doctrine now
that the extent of private power online is becoming clearer.
A second perspective might focus on the changing political
orientation of the federal judiciary. Since the highwater mark
of the Warren Court era, so this explanation would go, the federal judiciary in general, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, have grown more hostile to rights-based claims. Therefore, those who believe questions of legal doctrine are
inherently dependent on choices about political outcome would
argue that conservative judges wishing to limit constitutional
rights litigation have fixed on the state action doctrine as a
mechanism for keeping such claims out of court without even
considering their merits.
I find this explanation also less than fully persuasive. As
an initial matter, even the Warren Court never embraced a
theory of state action that would collapse the distinction between public and private behavior altogether.85 In addition, a
purely instrumental account of legal doctrine neglects the perceptions of judges themselves, 86 who tend to view their decision

84. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
85. For example, even Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which applied First Amendment norms to a private
shopping center, never went so far as to eradicate the distinction between public
and private altogether. To the contrary, the Court explicitly acknowledged “that
respondents’ ownership of the property here in question [might give] them various
rights, under the laws of Pennsylvania, to limit the use of that property by members of the public in a manner that would not be permissible were the property
owned by a municipality.” Id. at 319.
86. As Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote recently: “[J]udges’ views on
how they decide cases should be relevant to understanding how judges in fact de-
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making as largely constrained by an interlocking framework of
philosophical principles, legal precedent, and the evolving traditions of the nation.87 A theory of judicial decision making
that relies on the assumption that the decision makers being
described are either deluded or dissembling seems unlikely to
provide a fully satisfying explanation of behavior.88 Finally,
the instrumental account ignores the fact that the rhetoric of
judicial decision making, and not just the outcome, is a significant element in the dialogue between law and culture. Thus, if
the idea of differentiating public and private action were sufficiently repugnant to the culture at large, it is likely that the
judicial doctrine would ultimately be forced to change, regardless of the ideological persuasion of the judiciary.89
A third explanation for the continued vitality of the state
action doctrine is that, even if the public/private distinction is
incoherent, the doctrine nevertheless embodies other values
and intuitions about constitutional adjudication. This theory
has been advanced most powerfully by Richard Kay, who argues that the state action doctrine facilitates an essential divi-

cide cases.” Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1364 (1998); see also id. at 1338 (“[S]erious scholars
seeking to analyze the work of the courts cannot simply ignore the internal experiences of judges as irrelevant or disingenuously expressed. The qualitative impressions of those engaged in judging must be thoughtfully considered as part of
the equation.”).
87. See, e.g., Benjamin Cardozo, The Method of Sociology: The Judge as Legislator, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98–141 (1921); see also, e.g.,
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837 (“[M]embers of the federal judiciary strive,
most often successfully, to decide cases in accord with the law rather than with
their own ideological or partisan preferences.”).
88. More fundamentally, such an approach requires us to view debates
about legal doctrine in their worst possible light, as smokescreens to disguise the
fact that judgments are inevitably made based on factors that are supposed to be
extraneous to judicial decision making. I reject this perspective because I believe
it is more useful to resist the notion that our legal system is hopelessly compromised and instead try to understand our cultural practices as positive efforts to
effectuate ideals, imperfect and halting though those efforts may be. As Richard
Rorty has written, “Those who hope to persuade a nation to exert itself need to
remind their country of what it can take pride in as well as what it should be
ashamed of.” RICHARD RORTY, A CHIEVING OUR COUNTRY 3 (1997); see also Paul
Schiff Berman , An Alternative to Suspicion: Notes Towards a Less Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Scholarship, (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
author).
89. Cf. G RANT GILMORE, T HE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
1995) (discussing the cultural and legal shift from formalist ideas of contract to
more tort–like theories such as promissory estoppel).
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sion between constitutional law and “ordinary” law. According
to Kay, the Constitution has various attributes that “mark it
off from other kinds of law.”90 Kay contends that these attributes—including the Constitution’s focus on the scope and shape
of lawmaking power, its cumbersome amendment process, and
its appeal to relatively permanent principles—make constitutional law unsuitable for ordinary law, which “tends to be more
concerned with the resolution of day to day problems of social
living.”91 In Kay’s view, the state action doctrine is necessary
to maintain this distinction, lest we “create more occasions for
measuring the relative strengths of constitutional claims in . . .
particular circumstances. Given the breadth of such claims,
such a development would produce an even more widespread
employment of ad hoc balancing.”92
Kay presents a compelling case for understanding and justifying the longevity of the state action doctrine. Nevertheless,
as I will argue in Part III, Kay’s premise that constitutional
law should be divorced from “ordinary” law might be complicated by a consideration of the cultural value of constitutional
adjudication. In addition, I suspect that this more limited vision of the Constitution’s scope would not accord with most
people’s intuitive understanding of the nature of constitutional
rights. Thus, Kay’s explanation is subject to challenge both on
normative and descriptive grounds, and I will take up these
points in more detail below.
Finally, perhaps the most obvious reason that scholarly attack has failed to dislodge the public/private distinction is that
the distinction, however illogical, actually captures a fundamental societal intuition. Call it laissez-faireism if you wish,
but it seems to me that most of us think of our private choices
as being very different from the choices made by the state. As
a result, I doubt that the arguments against the public/private
distinction are likely to be successful, even if people find them
analytically persuasive. This may seem paradoxical, but there
is an important difference between arguments that are analytically persuasive and arguments that actually capture how we
experience the world on a day-to-day basis. For example, I
may, on some level, agree with the postmodern idea that there

90. Kay, supra note 53, at 338.
91. Id. at 338–39.
92. Id. at 339.
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is no such thing as an autonomously created work of authorship, only a text capable of multiple readings. 93 Nevertheless, I
may still experience my act of writing this article as a product
of a subjective “I.” An analytically compelling theory, therefore, may be resisted as an intuitive matter. Because successful legal arguments generally require both theoretical appeal
and a fit with lived experience,94 it is perhaps not surprising
that the public/private distinction survives.
Thus, instead of continuing to focus on the supposed incoherence of trying to distinguish public from private behavior,
those concerned with the unchecked exercise of private power
might wish to consider an alternative approach. It is to such
an approach that I now turn.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO STATE ACTION: THE
CONSTITUTION AS A CULTURAL TOUCHSTONE FOR
ARTICULATING AND DEBATING CONSTITUTIVE VALUES

Given that decades of scholarship attacking the public/private distinction have failed to dislodge the state action
doctrine, perhaps those who fear private power in cyberspace
(and elsewhere) should seek a different kind of critique. My
suggestion is that, instead of trying to argue that what we experience as private is actually public, perhaps we should focus
on the Constitution’s constitutive role in our cultural life, regardless of whether that life is lived in the public or private
sphere.
I have previously mentioned Richard Kay’s argument that
the state action doctrine helps to insure the distinction between
constitutional law and “ordinary” law. This distinction implicates fundamental questions about what a Constitution is and
what it is for, as well as the role legal discourse plays in the
culture at large. Thus, we must ask: whom does the Constitu93. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC,
TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977).
94. This idea is related to Ronald Dworkin’s concept of interpretation. In
Dworkin’s view, judges and legal philosophers must “provide the best constructive
interpretation of the community’s legal practice” when reaching conclusions.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986). If Dworkin is right, then good legal
decisions (or theories) must both “fit” and “justify” the community’s deepest understanding of reality. See id. at 228-38 (likening the legal decision making process to a chain novel in which the person creating the legal rule must construct the
best understanding of all chapters prior to the one being written).
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tion command? How far does the Constitution reach within our
legal system and our society? Where does constitutional law
leave off and “ordinary” law begin? And, most importantly for
our purposes, how might a fuller understanding of law’s cultural and symbolic roles in our society complicate Kay’s assumption that we should want to draw a clear distinction between constitutional and ordinary law? To address these
questions, I wish to focus on what I call “constitutive constitutionalism”: the idea that the Constitution might appropriately
be viewed as a touchstone for articulating constitutive values
and for structuring public debate about fundamental social and
political issues.
I begin this discussion by thinking about the potentially
transformative role legal discourse in general might play
within our society, especially given law’s centrality to American
culture. Only by understanding how important “law talk” is to
our national mythology can we attempt to understand the potential power of constitutional discourse as a form of collective
storytelling that helps form our self-identity as a people.
After this more general discussion, I consider specific cultural benefits we might derive from engaging in constitutional
discourse about a broader range of social interaction. The state
action debate ultimately boils down to the question of whether
or not the Constitution will be the touchstone for considering
whatever legal claim is at issue. If there is state action, then
the Constitution is the frame for analysis; if not, “ordinary” law
applies. From the perspective of constitutive constitutionalism,
there are at least three reasons why we should prefer a broader
scope for constitutional adjudication. First, the symbolic power
of the Constitution permits courts adjudicating constitutional
claims to play a rhetorical role in articulating national values.
Second, courts applying constitutional norms may sometimes
be a superior forum for addressing divisive political issues.
And third, constitutionalizing a debate may encourage a more
fruitful discourse in the society at large, because the relatively
abstract values enshrined in the Constitution encourage participants to stake out moral philosophical claims. Finally, I
suggest that one advantage of this vision of constitutive constitutionalism is that most Americans may find it to be more intuitively appealing than the incoherence critique.
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The Cultural Impact of Legal Discourse

I start from the premise that law and legal procedures are
at the core of American self-identity and are woven deeply into
the fabric of our culture. This is not a new insight. Indeed, de
Tocqueville’s famous observation that “[s]carcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner
or later, into a judicial question”95 has been repeated so often
that it has itself become a part of our national lore. Throughout the past century, we can see that de Tocqueville’s observation remains accurate. From the Scopes monkey trial to the
battles over pornography on the internet, from the national debate about abortion to the more recent clashes over doctorassisted suicide, from the success of novelist John Grisham to
the explosion of law shows on television, we can easily see that
our national obsession with law continues unabated. And, even
though lawyers are often objects of derision, when the chips are
down, we Americans are apt to frame our struggles in the language of competing rights and to fight our battles in a legal forum. Perhaps Thomas Paine sealed our legalistic fate over 200
years ago when he decreed that, in America, law would be
King.96
Moreover, in this country, law functions as far more than a
way of simply adjudicating disputes. It is also a forum for debating core societal values. In my opinion, this is not necessarily something to discourage. On the contrary, law can be a
useful forum for societal debate because it is inherently multivocal. Law is a social practice that both recognizes the existence of many different narratives, and also provides the opportunity to create new narratives that may help forge group
identity.97 Legal proceedings, therefore, function in part as a
site for adjudicating among various different explanatory narratives for describing reality.98
95. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Henry Reeve
trans., Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
96. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 29 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1969).
97. See Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment:
Reasoning About “the Woman Question” in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in
HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 133–34 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds. 1999).
98. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, An Observation and a Strange But
True “Tale”: What Might the Historical Trials of Animals Tell Us About the Trans-
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Both trials and judicial opinions, for example, ultimately
construct a narrative about a disputed event by rendering a decision or verdict. They do so, however, only after first enacting
a performance in which the society “creates, tests, changes, and
judges” the various competing discourses that could make up
our social knowledge.99 As James Boyd White has observed,
law’s strength is precisely in its ability to provide a forum for
testing the persuasive power of competing narratives:
The multiplicity of readings that the law permits is not its
weakness, but its strength, for it is this that makes room for
different voices, and gives a purchase by which culture may
be modified in response to the demands of circumstance. It
is a method at once for the recognition of others, for the acknowledgment of ignorance, and for cultural change.100

Law provides a set of institutions that emphasize the fact
that “we are a discoursing community, committed to talking
with each other about our differences of perception, feeling, and
value, our differences of language and experience.”101
In his seminal essay, Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover
argued that law functions in part as “a system of tension or a
bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative.”102 On this view, law is a language that allows us to discuss, imagine, and ultimately even perhaps generate alternative worlds spun from present reality.
Cover therefore
envisioned law as that which connects “reality” to “alternity.”103
From this perspective, law has enormous potential as a
creative and transformative discourse in our society. And this
potential is relevant to the state action debate because, rather
than thinking about whether behavior is properly character-

formative Potential of Law in American Culture? (forthcoming) (manuscript on file
with author).
99. Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social
Knowledge, in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW 17, 29
(Robert Hariman ed., 1990).
100. James B. White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 444 (1982).
101. JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 80 (1990).
102. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983).
103. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 176
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995).
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ized as public or private, we might instead consider how best to
use law to harness its power as a cultural story-teller. In other
words, if law is a forum for political and social discourse, how
can we make that forum as fruitful as possible? The next section explores possible reasons to prefer constitutional discourse
over “ordinary” law talk.
B.

Cultural Benefits of Broader Constitutional Discourse
1.

The Symbolic Power of the Constitution and the
Role of Courts as Shapers of Social Memory

The Constitution undoubtedly has important symbolic
power within our society. As Sanford Levinson has pointed
out, our Constitution can be analogized to a sacred text that is
invoked in order to emphasize national unity and integration.104 The Constitution, particularly its rights-bearing provisions, symbolizes enshrined societal values and commitments.
“Individuals see this national symbol (the Constitution) as
promising effective legal entitlements and protections, and
they often receive reassurance from lawyers that the Constitution—and the legal system—stand ready to deliver those protections.”105
Because of this symbolic power, court decisions interpreting constitutional values may help to articulate (and shape) societal discourse on divisive issues. Indeed, as Reva Siegel has
argued, the Constitution can serve as a vehicle for social memory. The Constitution allows us to tell stories about a common
past. Such stories permit people to constitute themselves as a
collective, with certain experiences, expectations, entitlements,
obligations, and commitments in common.106 These stories
“also supply structures of ordinary understanding, frameworks
within which ordinary members of a society interpret experience and make positive and normative judgments concerning
it.”107 Thus, the Constitution can be seen as a way in which we
create what scholars refer to as “collective memory.”108
104. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988).
105. Christopher E. Smith, Law and Symbolism, 1997 DET. C. L. REV. 935,
938 (1997).
106. See Siegel, supra note 97, at 133.
107. Id. at 134.
108. For a discussion of collective memory, see generally IWONA
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If the Constitution is part of the way in which we develop
collective memory, then lawyers, judges, and citizens, when
they interpret the Constitution, are also engaged in the task of
creating and reflecting our social reality.
[W]hen lawyers interpret the Constitution, they are contributing to the stock of narratives that, passed from generation to generation, constitute our civic identity, norms,
and purposes. Judicial decisions are thus products of social
memory; at the same time they are one of the many social
institutions that produce social memory.109

These educative,110 expressive,111 and narrative112 roles
may be present even in circumstances when the courts’ power
to enforce the Constitution is weak.113 For example, the U.S.
IRWIN–ZARECKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE
MEMORY (1994), and works cited therein.
109. Siegel, supra note 97, at 135.
110. See, e.g. , Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (arguing that the “Supreme Court is,
among other things, an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers
in a vital national seminar”); Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously,
104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 103 (1990) (commenting upon “the educative role of Supreme Court opinions”). Although some have argued against the idea that the
Supreme Court serves an educative role, see, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 131 (1991) (“Most
Americans neither follow Supreme Court decisions nor understand the Court’s
constitutional role. It is not surprising, then, that change in public opinion appears to be oblivious to the Court.”), such a position is less persuasive if we consider the educational value as stretching over a longer period of time, see, e.g.,
Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court,
84 N W. U. L. REV. 985, 1021-22 (1990) (“While our studies do not sculpt a Court
that could change most people’s minds overnight-or even during the Justices’ lifetimes . . . the Court can play a constrained role in making controversial public
policies more acceptable, make marginal changes in alignments and, perhaps as
important, keep a large portion of the flock together.”). For a thoughtful discussion of the question, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court
an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992).
111. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., How Does Law Matter?, 1 G REEN BAG 2D
265, 265 (1998).
An expressive account of law directs attention to law’s role in proclaiming social norms. Such norms provide a vocabulary of judgment that
helps constitute everyday life as a world of distinct human meaning. If
we expand our vision of law to take this function into account, we will
have a richer sense of the complex relationship between law and culture.
Id.
112. See Siegel, supra note 97, at 133–35.
113. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 C ORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997) (arguing that, even if American
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Supreme Court’s declaration in Brown v. Board of Education114
that racially-segregated schools were inherently unequal had
significant symbolic value, even though legally-enforced segregation persisted for many years,115 and de facto segregation
still exists today.
Of course, some may justly believe that symbolic statements are woefully insufficient when true enforcement is necessary, but that does not mean that symbolic statements are
not independently valuable. Indeed, “[a]lthough actual implementation of school desegregation took many years, the Supreme Court’s decision [in Brown] constituted an important
symbolic statement that could call attention to injustice, confer
legitimacy upon civil rights activists, and encourage political
mobilization against discrimination.”116 As Laurence Tribe has
pointed out, also in the context of race, the Supreme Court can
use its “rights-declaration powers” to help change attitudes
about social issues such as “ghettoization.”117 Tribe argues
that such declarations, even if largely symbolic, create “positive
social and political tension, the sort of tension that makes kids
grow up thinking something is wrong, instead of inevitable,
about ghettoization.”118
Thus, particularly when articulating constitutional values,
the position of courts within our society provides them “with
unique legitimacy to advance ideas symbolically.”119 By focusing on symbolic power, we may see that courts do not simply
adjudicate disputes or balance incentives and disincentives for
behavior. Rather, they “help constitute a cultural world by investing it with moral meaning.”120 Part of the role of courts
and law is to “express[ ] what is valuable and what is not, what

courts lack the capacity to enforce a constitutional right to work, there is still
value in looking to our basic constitutional principles for guidance on the issue).
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. See P ETER IRONS, T HE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 109–10 (1988)
(“The Supreme Court’s refusal to set deadlines for desegregation invited Southern
officials to invent foot-dragging tactics, and frustrated the NAACP lawyers who
had struggled for years with cautious and often hostile federal judges, most of
them closely tied to [the] local power structures.”)
116. Smith, supra note 105, at 939.
117. See Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989).
118. Id.
119. Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L.
REV. 797, 845 (1990).
120. Regan, supra note 111, at 271.
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merits praise, and what deserves blame, and what we may reasonably expect from one another.”121 This symbolic, educative,
and expressive role is equally strong, whether the behavior
being discussed is “public” or “private.” For example, the symbolic importance of Brown does not depend on the fact that the
schools being discussed happened to be public. Brown’s statement about the dangers inherent in a racially-segregated society transcended any distinction between public and private.
Similarly, in the cyberspace context, court decisions concerning
possible threats to constitutional values from private parties
online might well generate the kind of debate and consideration about fundamental policy choices that Lessig urges.122
2.

Constitutional Adjudication as a Deliberative
Forum

In recent decades, much political theory—liberal, communitarian, and civic republican—has focused on the conditions
for effective political discourse, deliberation, and decision.123
These debates are far beyond the scope of this article. Never-

121. Id.
122. It could be argued that this symbolic, expressive, and educative power
would be lessened if more societal behavior were subjected to constitutional scrutiny. It is difficult to know how one would go about proving this point either way.
I note, however, that two periods when the United States Supreme Court has
treated its role more expansively—the so called Lochner era early in the 20th century and the period of expanding judicial protection of individual rights from the
1950s to 1970s—appear to correspond with periods when constitutional decisions
have achieved great symbolic power and been the focus of substantial political and
social debate.
123. See, e.g., D EMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: C ONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES
OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); SEYLA BENHABIB, S ITUATING THE
SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS
(1992); W ILLIAM GALSTON, L IBERAL PURPOSES: G OODS, V IRTUES, AND DIVERSITY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); WILLIAM GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD
(1980); JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989);
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998); MICHAEL
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY (1996); C HARLES TAYLOR, ET. AL ., M ULTICULTURALISM: E XAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (1994); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
(1983); IRIS YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Amy
Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 308 (Summer 1985).
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theless, it is worth considering whether courts, particularly
when they are engaged in constitutional adjudication, may
sometimes provide a superior forum for debating and resolving
hotly contested political issues.
For example, Michael Selmi, in his careful review124 of the
Supreme Court’s decision-making process in Bakke v. Regents
of the University of California,125 argues that “the Supreme
Court’s purported distance from politics allow[ed] it to engage
in the [type of] political discussion that John Rawls envisions
for the public arena, one where reason, influenced—but not
dominated—by ideology, [guides] the Court’s decision.”126 As
Selmi points out, the Bakke Court engaged the nation in a discussion on affirmative action that, to this day, has largely been
unavailable in the political arena. The Court carefully surveyed the opinions of groups and individuals from around the
country, and then “sought to find some acceptable position—one that would right what the Court perceived as an individual injustice to Allan Bakke, while preserving the ability
to use preferences to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination.”127 Although the Bakke decision arguably reflected public
opinion at the time (and perhaps even today)128 it is important
to realize that the public has rarely reached such a consensus
through the political process, where the discussion tends to be
captured by the most intransigent advocates at both poles of
the debate.129 Indeed, as Selmi notes, “[e]ven though the po-

124. See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J. 981 (1999).
125. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
126. Selmi, supra note 124, at 984.
127. Id. at 1018.
128. Similarly, though certainly controversial, the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), arguably has fashioned
a constitutional compromise that reflects the consensus position on this issue
within American society.
129. Compare, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996) (challenging all affirmative action programs); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 799-803 (1979) (criticizing Bakke and advocating a colorblind policy), with, e.g., B RYAN K. F AIR, N OTES OF A RACIAL CASTE
BABY 172–75 (1996) (arguing for unqualified support for affirmative action);
Wendy Brown-Scott, Unpacking the Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. R EV. 801, 814 (1995) (stating that “Bakke chilled the potential effectiveness of
affirmative action as a tool of inclusion”); David M. White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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litical climate has become seemingly more hostile to affirmative
action in recent years, legislatures—particularly Congress—have expressed surprisingly little interest in revisiting
or revising affirmative action programs.”130 Instead, legislatures seem content to allow courts to make such judgments.131
Thus, although courts are certainly not the only possible
forum for articulating fundamental societal values or reaching
a consensus on difficult political issues, they may sometimes
provide a more satisfying resolution than the political process
can. As Owen Fiss has pointed out, unlike legislatures, which
“see their primary function in terms of registering the actual,
occurrent preferences of the people,” courts may be more
“ideologically committed [and] institutionally suited to search
for the meaning of constitutional values.”132 Because of this
difference, Fiss argues, judges may be uniquely qualified to be
the final arbiters on issues involving fundamental social values. Moreover, as Selmi’s account indicates, “[w]ith its mandate to decide cases and in the absence of clear polarization,
the Supreme Court may provide the only hope for reaching an
acceptable reasoned political compromise.”133 And again, the
power of courts in this regard does not depend on whether the
entity being discussed is strictly governmental. The Bakke decision would have had much the same function as public discourse, whether the university in question were public or private.

REV. 89 (1979) (criticizing Bakke decision for failing to challenge admissions practices). As Selmi points out, “[a]lthough there have been some exceptions to this
polarization, it is far more common that those who care most about the issue have
been unwilling to support the Bakke position, and instead have devoted their time
and attention to fighting the extremes.” Selmi, supra note 124, at 984 n.20.
130. Selmi, supra note 124, at 1019–20.
131. Even the recent California and Washington laws prohibiting the use of
preferences were both passed by ballot initiative rather than through legislation.
See L YDIA CHÁVEZ, T HE COLOR BIND 18 (1998) (discussing the California initiative); Stephen A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A25 (noting that the organizers of the Washington
ballot initiative “had stumbled in Congress and legislatures”).
132. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
133. Selmi, supra note 124, at 1020.
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The Constitution’s Appeal to Moral Principles

Most of the rights-bearing provisions of the United States
Constitution are drafted in very broad and abstract language,
such as “freedom of speech,” “equal protection,” “due process,”
and “privileges or immunities of . . . citizenship.” Ronald
Dworkin has argued that “we all—judges, lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice.”134 For example, the First Amendment
embodies an abstract moral commitment to free expression.
When we are faced with a controversial constitutional issue—such as whether the First Amendment permits laws restricting pornography—we must decide how best to honor that
commitment. As Dworkin puts it, we “must decide whether the
true ground of the moral principle that condemns censorship,
in the form in which this principle has been incorporated into
American law, extends to the case of pornography.”135 In
Dworkin’s view, most significant constitutional arguments will
inevitably turn on questions of political morality.136
Just as importantly, Dworkin argues that constitutional
interpretation is disciplined by what he calls “integrity.”137
Thus, judges are not free to import their own particular moral
judgments into the Constitution’s clauses unless that judgment
is “consistent in principle with the structural design of the
Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of
past constitutional interpretation by other judges.”138 Accordingly, they must seek to articulate “the best conception of constitutional moral principles . . . that fits the broad story of

134. RONALD DWORKIN, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise,
in F REEDOM’S LAW: T HE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1, 2
(1996).
135. Id.
136. Dworkin recognizes, of course, that a “moral reading is not appropriate
to everything a constitution contains.” Id. at 8. He acknowledges that “[t]he
American Constitution includes a great many clauses that are neither particularly abstract nor drafted in the language of moral principle.” Id. For example,
Article II specifies that the President must be at least thirty-five years old, and
the Third Amendment states that the government may not quarter soldiers in
citizens’ homes. Dworkin argues that, although the Third Amendment may have
been inspired by a moral principle (e.g., privacy), its content is not a general principle of privacy. See id.
137. Id. at 10; see also DWORKIN, supra note 94, at 225–75.
138. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at 10.
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America’s historical record.”139 This idea echoes Justice Cardozo’s famous understanding of due process as those “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”140
If this vision is correct, then it may be that we as a people
can derive great benefit from having our fundamental societal
disputes framed in constitutional terms. Arguments about contentious issues, when cast in the language of the Constitution,
encourage a discourse about core philosophical values rather
than one rooted in political expediency or rancorous namecalling. Moreover, constitutional interpretation requires us to
consider an entire history of national values and commitments.
Thus, even in debate we may come to feel more bound to each
other and our constitutional tradition than we otherwise
would.
Instead of simply shouting at each other about
whether, for example, burning the American flag is acceptable
behavior, we may have a more profitable community discussion
when the argument is framed in the more abstract language of
our First Amendment jurisprudence. Similarly, in 1997, we as
a society engaged in what some might think was a useful societal discussion about the intractable issue of euthanasia, largely
because the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the question141
and the debate was therefore framed in constitutional terms.
As Dworkin points out, “[I]ndividual citizens may be able to exercise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final
decisions are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to
courts, whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on
the weight of numbers or the balance of political influence.”142
Even scholars such as Louis Michael Seidman and Mark
Tushnet, who are generally skeptical about the societal benefits of constitutional discourse,143 acknowledge that the mental
discipline required to fashion “neutral” constitutional principles can promote “constitutional statesmanship.”144 They suggest that such constitutional debate might

139. Id. at 11.
140. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
141. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
142. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at 30.
143. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996).
144. Id. at 197.
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build political community by changing the perspective of
people who advance constitutional argument. Reflective
people who submit to this discipline in good faith may come
to understand that if circumstances had been a little different—if their parents had a different set of values, for example—they might well find themselves believing just as
deeply in what they actually reject as they believe what
they now accept.145

This vision of maturity, self-knowledge, and tolerance is
the promise (though admittedly not always the reality) of constitutional discourse. As Michael J. Perry has argued, through
the constitutional dialogue between the Supreme Court and the
polity,
what emerges is a far more self-critical political morality
than would otherwise appear, and therefore likely a more
mature political morality as well—a morality that is moving
(inching?) toward, even though it has not always and everywhere arrived at, right answers, rather than a stagnant
or even regressive morality.146

From this perspective, we stand to lose quite a bit if our
great debates fail to reach the constitutional plateau because of
a lack of “state action.”

145. Id. at 198.
146. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 113 (1982). See also A LEXANDER BICKEL, T HE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970).
Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives. They are never, at the start, conversations between equals.
The Court has an edge, because it initiates things with some immediate
action, even if limited. But conversations they are, and to say that the
Supreme Court lays down the law of the land is to state the ultimate result, following upon a complex series of events, in some cases, and in
others it is a form of speech only.
Id. Similar themes can be found in the work of other commentators. See, e.g.,
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: A T HEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 182–83
(1982); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L. J. 1013, 1047–49 (1984); Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and
Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339, 397 (1987). See generally Robert F.
Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 C ONST. COMMENT. 9, 15 (1987). But
see, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue,
5 CONST. COMMENT. 375 (1988) (critiquing such “dialogue theories”).
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The Intuitive Appeal of Constitutive Constitutionalism

The argument of constitutive constitutionalism—that we
might wish to use the Constitution as a cultural touchstone for
resolving more of our disputes as a people—is potentially just
as sweeping as abolishing the distinction between public and
private, perhaps even more so. Yet it may be more likely to
have intuitive appeal than the incoherence critique. Although
it is difficult to accept that our private activities are really part
of the extended apparatus of the state and its laws, I suspect
that most Americans, if questioned, would assume that they
possess the rights embodied in the Constitution at all times,
and not only when dealing with the government. Indeed,
we
are apt to use the language of rights in popular discourse even
in situations where the dispute concerns only “private” entities.
For example, employees often view restrictions on their freedom of expression147 or invasions of their privacy in the workplace148 as constitutional issues. In addition, as recently as
this year, when a baseball pitcher was suspended for derogatory remarks he made about ethnic and racial minorities, much
of the talk concerned whether the punishment violated First
Amendment principles, even though Major League Baseball is
a non-state entity.149 Similarly, when large retailers decided to
147. For example, when Disney attempted to crack down on employees with
facial hair, one employee with a moustache said, “I’m doing everything in my
power to keep it. I’m exercising my constitutional right, which is freedom of expression.” See Brad Hanson, Disney Hotel’s Hairy 6 Officially Told to Shave, L.A.
TIMES (Orange County), Mar. 22, 1988, pt. 2, at 3.
148. See, e.g., Reid Kanaley, Somebody’s Watching You at Work, DES
MOINES REG, Sept. 20, 1999, at 16 (quoting the director of management studies at
the American Management Association as saying: “People naturally assume that
they carry their constitutional rights to privacy into the workplace with them, but
they don’t”); Gwen Carleton, Somebody’s Watching: “Worker Beware” as Companies Crack Down on E–Mail Abuses, CAP. T IMES (Madison, WI), Apr. 9, 1999, at
1C (quoting a representative of the Electronic Privacy Information Center as
saying: “We feel that when you enter a workplace you don’t give up all your constitutional rights”).
149. See, e.g., J.A. Adande, Now, Baseball Has Spoken: Selig’s Action Tramples the 1 st Amendment and Does Nothing to Correct the Real Problem Behind
Pitcher, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at D1 (arguing that Rocker’s speech should be
controlled by allowing the public to decide whether or not to support the Braves
and its players, not through suspension by Major League Baseball); Gerald
McGuirk, Letter, Does Suspension Infringe on Rocker’s Right to Speak?,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 2000, at A45 (“If we believe in free speech and other forms of
free expression, let’s be even-handed in permitting their exercise.”). Even a law
professor, Alan Dershowitz, while acknowledging that, because of the state action
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edit or restrict specific music albums, videos, and magazines
because of their content, popular debates about this private
“censorship” were framed in a language that was based on intuitions about the content of the Constitution.150 Finally, although private discrimination and harassment claims are
technically brought pursuant to statutes, I suspect that most
Americans view them as constitutional claims.
A broader vision of the Constitution’s scope may also be
more palatable because it is relatively easy for most of us to see
that core constitutional values and commitments can be
threatened by private entities, and that we need a productive
language for debating what to do about such threats. Indeed,
concerns about private power run deep in our history, at least
since the mid-nineteenth century. As Willard Hurst has argued in the economic arena, although this “society had,
through the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, a broadly shared faith that a rising material standard of
living would make for a better society,”151 that consensus also
condemned “individuals or groups [who] were pursuing private
interests in ways that deeply imperiled achievement of a rising
standard of living.”152 In this dichotomy, Hurst sees the impetus for antitrust legislation, as well as laws regulating labor,
and food, drug, and product safety. We see similar concerns
about private power today in the debates about plant closings
and corporate citizenship, in the public uneasiness about megamergers, in the debates about campaign finance reform, and in
the critical commentary on technology giants like Microsoft and
America Online.
But concerns about private power have not been limited to
the economic sphere. In our constitutional jurisprudence, too,
doctrine, the Constitution permitted Major League Baseball to suspend Rocker,
nevertheless argued that the “decision violates the spirit of free speech which
animates the First Amendment.” Alan Dershowitz, Editorial, Baseball’s Speech
Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at A21.
150. See, e.g., David Pearl, Letter, No to Censorship, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Jan. 6, 1997, at 1E (“The bottom line is that Wal-Mart is taking the role as parents, as well as violating the First Amendment of the Constitution.”); Anne M.
Russell, Editorial, Free Speech’s Weakest Voice, Retailers, F OLIO, Mar. 1997, at 7
(“The tenets of the First Amendment ring increasingly hollow as retailers like
Blockbuster. [sic] Wal-Mart and Diamond Shamrock act as self-appointed censors
of video-tapes, CDs and periodicals.”).
151. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED
STATES 221 (1977).
152. Id. at 222.
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the Supreme Court has often expanded the state action doctrine to reach particularly worrisome private activity. Although Shelley v. Kraemer153 is rightly viewed as the broadest
Supreme Court reading of “state action” to date, perhaps more
relevant to cyberspace is Amalgamated Food Employees Union
v. Logan Valley Plaza.154 In that case, the Court determined
that the First Amendment protection for peaceful protest extended to privately-owned shopping malls. The Court recognized that “[t]he largescale movement of this country’s population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by the
advent of the suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of
individual retail units on a single large privately owned
tract.”155 Given such societal change, the Court concluded that
there was a very real threat that private parties, if allowed to
exercise their property rights unchecked, could effectively
eliminate the First Amendment in the country’s primary business districts. Although the Court subsequently backed away
from its conclusions in Logan Valley,156 the decision reflects
our nation’s long-standing fears about private power, particularly when it is clear that private entities might occupy a
sphere that we have traditionally assumed to be public.
Finally, there can be little doubt that, even with a stricter
application of the state action doctrine, constitutional values
nevertheless exert a strong influence on our legislative and
judge-made law concerning private activity.157 For example,
the constitutional principle that the government may not discriminate based on race has certainly influenced the enactment
and content of statutes prohibiting such discrimination in the
private sector.158 Similarly, modern labor legislation can be

153. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
154. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
155. Id. at 324.
156. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1975); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972).
157. For a discussion of this influence, see William B. Fisch & Richard S.
Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
437, 452–53 (1998). Fisch and Kay point out that, under the German principle of
drittwirkung, this influence is formalized, so that judicial interpretation of private
law rules must take into consideration constitutional values. See id. Although
such formal influence does not exist in the American system, Fisch and Kay argue
that the United States Constitution exerts considerable informal influence on private law legislation and adjudication. See id.
158. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 1.01[1], at 1–3
(3d ed. 1994).

COLORADO FINAL FINAL.DOC

2000]

CYBERSPACE AND STATE ACTION

5/23/00 5:45 AM

1305

seen as an attempt to import constitutional principles of free
expression and association into the workplace.159 And many
common-law doctrines borrow from constitutional principles
such as “due process of law,”160 the right to privacy and autonomy,161 or “public policy” grounded in constitutional values.162
Thus, the idea of applying constitutional norms to private behavior is not as foreign to our national culture as the formal divisions of the state action doctrine might lead one to believe.
CONCLUSION
Debates about the state action doctrine are arising again
in the online context largely because we are facing the very real
possibility that all of cyberspace will become an effectively private, Constitution-free zone. In cyberspace, one uses privatelyowned browsers to access privately-owned online service providers, with messages traveling over privately-owned routers to
privately-owned web sites. Moreover, perhaps the single
greatest form of control in cyberspace, the governance of the
domain name system, is currently in the hands of a private notfor-profit corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”).163 And, the “code writers” of
cyberspace, who have functioned to this point through rela-

159. See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and
Enrichment of Democracy, Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
689. On the interaction of constitutional doctrine and legislation, see generally
Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1
(1993).
160. See, e.g., Ascherman v. St. Francis Mem. Hosp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510
(Cal. App. 1975) (invoking cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to determine whether private hospital used “fair procedures” in denying application of
physician for hospital staff privileges).
161. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80–84 (N.Y. 1990) (using
due process clause of state constitution to derive common law right to refuse
medical treatment).
162. For example, an employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee has
been held subject to an exception for terminations based on race or gender. See,
e.g., Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Systems Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328, 330–32
(Va. 1994). Such a “public policy” exception “cannot be separated from the modern judicial elaboration of the constitutional requirement of ‘equal protection of
the laws.’” Fisch & Kay, supra note 157, at 453.
163. For a critique of ICANN’s largely unreviewable power, see generally
David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, or Where is James Madison When We Need
Him? (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/
comment1.html>.
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tively independent bodies of experts setting policy by means of
open meetings and consensus decision making,164 are now at
risk of being captured by competitive market interests.165
Thus, “[w]e are entering a world where code is corporate in a
commercial sense, and leaving a world where code was corporate in a very different sense.”166
As a result of this activity, the hope that cyberspace will be
a space where individual liberties and constitutional values are
a necessary part of the architecture might rapidly fade unless
we are willing to rethink the state action doctrine. As Lessig
states:
If code functions as law, then we are creating the most significant new jurisdiction since the Louisiana Purchase, yet
we are building it just outside the Constitution’s review.
Indeed, we are building it just so that the Constitution will
not govern—as if we want to be free of the constraints of
value embedded by that tradition.167

Why might a broader conception of state action, influenced
by the idea of constitutive constitutionalism, be useful? If we
return to the Cyber Promotions case discussed earlier, we can
see that, by applying the state action doctrine, the court was
able to resolve the First Amendment claim against AOL without having to engage in any discussion about the role of free
expression in cyberspace or the potential encroachment on such
freedom by online service providers. Invocation of the state action doctrine, therefore, undoubtedly made the adjudicatory
process somewhat easier, but it also muted the court’s ability to
articulate values, weigh the various competing interests with

164. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Towards a
Critical Theory of Cyberspace (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.discourse.net/
ILSdraft-nov99.pdf> (arguing that the Internet standard-setting process may be
the first international rule-making process to fulfill Jürgen Habermas’s demanding criteria for legitimate law-making processes). See also L ESSIG, supra note 1,
at 207 (describing the Internet Engineering Task Force and other standardsetting organizations as “regulatory bodies whose standards set policy, but they
were in one sense disinterested in the outcomes: they wanted to produce nothing
more than code that would work”).
165. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 207 (“We are entering a very different
world where code is written within companies; where standards are the product of
competition; where standards tied to a dominant standard have advantages.”).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 217.
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regard to speech and censorship in cyberspace, and foster societal discussion about the way behavior might be regulated online. In other words, the court was rendered powerless to address any of the issues that, according to Lessig, we as a society
most need to debate.
For example, had the court addressed the merits of the
case, it would have been forced to consider whether America
Online had acquired such a stranglehold on information access
that it should be treated as a quasi-public facility or a common
carrier that cannot selectively block speech.168 Conversely, the
court might have concluded that the First Amendment speech
rights of America Online itself require that it be permitted to
exclude speakers as it sees fit.169 In evaluating these questions, the court likely would have asked whether online service
providers—at least with regard to e-mail—are more appropriately thought of as neutral information conduits or as content
providers exercising their own editorial control. Such questions and provisional answers might have been useful in focusing societal debate about the nature and power of online
service providers.
Similarly, a broader view of the Constitution’s scope would
reach the private standard-setting bodies—which now function
so powerfully (yet so invisibly) to establish the code that regulates cyberspace—and subject them to constitutional norms of
fair process and judicial review. This approach might also provide a constitutional forum for debating many of the criticisms
leveled at ICANN on account of its claimed lack of public participation and transparent processes.170
There are, of course, possible objections that might be
raised to this vision of constitutive constitutionalism. For example, some might argue that applying the Constitution more
broadly could result in a far greater number of legal disputes
being resolved through the ad hoc application of a vague balancing calculus.171 However, although it is certainly possible

168. Such a conclusion might follow the reasoning of Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946), and Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
169. Such a conclusion might follow the reasoning of Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
170. See, e.g., Post, supra note 163; see generally <http://www.
ICANNWatch.org> (visited Feb. 20, 2000).
171. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 53, at 340; William P. Marshall, Diluting
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to criticize the use of balancing tests, 172 such tests have the virtue of permitting courts to articulate essential values and principles while at the same time recognizing that applying these
principles must necessarily depend on a nuanced examination
of the circumstances of each case.173 As discussed previously,
courts are educative and expressive institutions as well as adjudicative bodies; therefore articulating foundational principles
can be as important as providing a fixed resolution to possible
future cases. Moreover, although the use of such a flexible approach might initially bring uncertainty as to precise constitutional boundaries for “private” behavior, it is likely that, over
time, those boundaries would become clearer and more stable
as the common law system began to adjudicate cases and the
intrinsic limits of precedent began to take hold.
Others might worry that, if constitutional norms are applied to a wider set of activities, the constitutional principles

Constitutional Rights: Rethinking “Rethinking State Action,” 80 NW. U. L. REV.
558, 563–67 (1985).
172. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
173. While recognizing its dangers, Louis Henkin has articulated the fundamental attraction of a balancing approach:
Balancing is highly appealing. It provides bridges between the abstractions of principle and the life of facts. It bespeaks moderation and reasonableness, the Golden Mean. It refines the process of judicial review.
It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes room for judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree. It provides an answer, or the way to an
answer—sometimes the only answer—to what the Constitution means
when the words do not say what it means, to many a constitutional tension or issue not readily resolved without it. The flexibility it provides
may have been an important ingredient in making judicial review work
and rendering it acceptable.
Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1022, 1047 (1978). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, More Is Not Less: A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1985).
[T]he fact that there are not easy solutions or determinate answers does
not explain why [balancing] is undesirable. . . . [C]ourts constantly
choose between competing values in situations where no easy or determinate answers. . . . Upholding equality inevitably sacrifices liberty;
ending discrimination eliminates someone’s liberty to discriminate. The
examples are endless; it is difficult to even think of many important constitutional cases in which a difficult value conflict does not exist.
Id. See also Burt Neuborne, Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First
Amendment Cases, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 576, 577 (1987–88) (arguing that
even in cases seemingly grounded in logic, definition, or categorization, the same
elements of judicial choice are in play, though their existence is submerged and
unarticulated).
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themselves could become watered down.174 This concern is a
real and troubling one. Nevertheless, although I certainly
would not advocate the dilution of substantive constitutional
rights, I would be prepared to accept that result. It is inevitable that the content of constitutional rights will change over
time as the values of the nation change, and the great advantage of this broader conception of the Constitution’s scope is
that at least the conversation about constitutional values truly
will be about those values. The discussion will not be swept off
the table by arbitrary application of the state action doctrine,
which has the effect of forestalling all debate about the substance of the constitutional norms themselves.
Finally, I recognize, of course, that there are other considerations that might argue in favor of a narrower vision of constitutional adjudication. For example, those who believe courts
to be fundamentally anti-democratic might not wish to entrust
courts with responsibility for adjudicating even more of our
fundamental social and political questions. Others might see a
broader conception of constitutional application as a threat to
principles of federalism, because federal courts would be empowered to play a greater role in creating national standards.
Still others might worry that applying the Constitution to a
wider range of activities might result in more constitutional
litigation and more uncertainty with respect to legal outcomes,
leading to increased costs and decreased efficiency. Complete
answers to these objections (which implicate well-developed
debates in American constitutional history) are beyond the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, I readily acknowledge that
for some people (perhaps including judges) such concerns will
ultimately outweigh the cultural benefits I have suggested.
The point is not that we should necessarily jettison the
state action doctrine, but that, before we can truly analyze the
costs and benefits of the doctrine, we must consider the cultural value we as a nation derive from the act of constitutional
adjudication. The supposed incoherence of the distinction between public and private is not the only possible objection to
the state action doctrine, nor even necessarily the most persua-

174. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 171, at 569 (arguing that doing away
with the state action doctrine would “‘trivialize’ the meaning of constitutional protection and thereby weaken the force of a claim of ‘true’ constitutional violation by
overexposure”).
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sive or the most intuitively appealing argument that might be
raised. If we are truly to grapple with the problem of private
power, in cyberspace and elsewhere, then we must also consider the Constitution’s importance as a constitutive part of our
national psyche and the productive role that constitutional
adjudication might play as a forum for debating our national
dilemmas, articulating our national values, and helping define
a national story about the nature of our collective commitments. Only then can a broader debate about the Constitution,
state action, and cyberspace truly begin.

